systems vary widely in their details, only four basic configurations in the relationship between fact-finding, discretionary choice, and appellate review are possible. No system in either Category 1 or 2 presents a Sixth Amendment difficulty because the jury finds all the facts upon which determination of a sentence depends.
Category 3: The facts found by the jury or admitted by the defendant generate a range of sentencing options among which the judge may choose in his or her discretion.

The sentence is unreviewable on appeal (except for reliance on unconstitutional factors).
Any system in Category 3 likewise avoids Sixth Amendment problems, but to understand why requires more careful analysis than might initially appear. The easy explanation is that some systems in this category, such as the federal sentencing regime as it existed immediately before the adoption of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, simply require no post-conviction judicial findings of fact as part of the sentencing 8 Even a system that employs both jury fact-finding and jury discretion as to penalty in the sentencing phase must account for guilty pleas. It could empanel a sentencing jury for every case in which a guilty plea is entered and task that jury with finding sentencing facts and exercising sentencing discretion. Or it could delegate to the judge both fact-finding and penalty discretion in all cases resolved by plea. However, if it chooses the latter course, then as to all cases resolved by plea the system will fall into either Category 3 or 4.
process. 9 However, the distinguishing feature of Category 3 systems is not that they do not require judges to find facts, but that they contain no enforceable rules which constrain judicial discretion by correlating judicial findings of fact to required or preferred outcomes. For example, even if the pre-Guidelines federal sentencing regime had required that the sentencing judge provide a statement of reasons including findings of the facts justifying the sentence chosen, the system would not have offended Blakely's reading of the Sixth Amendment in the absence of rules connecting judicially found facts to outcomes and thereby placing some legal constraint on judicial discretion. 
All the sentencing systems that have presented the Supreme Court with Sixth
Amendment questions fall into Category 4. However, the Supreme Court's opinions from Apprendi to Cunningham fail to provide a coherent rule for which do and which do not violate the Sixth Amendment because the Court, mesmerized by an obsession with fact-finding, articulates no theory about the constitutionally required relationship between judicial fact-finding, judicial sentencing discretion, and appellate review.
The linchpin of the Apprendi-Blakely-Cunningham line is a supposed "bright line rule" distinguishing sentencing systems that violate the Sixth Amendment from those that do not. 10 In Apprendi, the court said that, " [A] ny fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." 11 In Blakely, the Court declared that, " [T] he 'statutory maximum' for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant…." 12 In short, a judge many not impose a sentence higher than that which would be legally possible based purely on the jury's verdict or the defendant's admissions, if, in order to do so, he must find any additional fact whatever (other than facts relating to prior convictions 13 ). There are two glaring problems with this supposed "bright line rule":
First, if applied strictly, the "bright line rule" amounts to a declaration that where judicial sentencing discretion exists, the exercise of that discretion cannot be subject to the rule of law (or at least law may not govern discretion unless the law takes bizarre and twisted forms). While this may seem an extreme characterization of the Court's holding, it flows ineluctably from the nature of the legal process. Second, the "bright line rule" cannot explain the result in Booker and thus provides no guidance in determining the permissible contours of the post-Booker federal system. Moreover, in every existing sentencing system in which conviction presents the judge a choice of more and less severe punishments for the same crime, a rational sentencing judge must find the existence of aggravating non-element factors in order to justify imposition of some subset of the legally available sentences. If, as was the case in California in Cunningham, the law provides for a lower, middle, and upper term upon conviction, a rational judge would be obliged find some non-element fact to justify imposition of the upper term even if the law did not affirmatively require it. Similarly, if the law provides a presumptive, aggravated, and mitigated range upon conviction, as was true in the Washington guideline scheme invalidated in Blakely, 15 a rational judge is obliged to find some non-element aggravating fact to rationally justify imposition of a sentence in the aggravated range. Even in a system that specified no middle term or presumptive middle range but instead, upon conviction, presented the sentencing judge with an undifferentiated range within which to exercise sentencing discretion, a rational judge would nonetheless have to identify some non-element aggravating factor to justify a sentence at the upper end of the range.
Thus far, law has not entered into the analysis. We are merely defining the Likewise, in sentencing, as elsewhere, a rule creating a presumption may be a form of law. Consider a rule stating that a judicial finding of Fact X creates a presumption that a sentence of 10-12 years is proper, but that some other sentence may be imposed if there exist extraordinary aggravating or mitigating circumstances sufficient to overcome the presumption. Such a rule is a rule of law so long as an appellate court can overturn a sentence outside the range, either on the ground that the sentencing judge found no aggravating or mitigating circumstance, or on the ground that the circumstances found were not sufficiently "extraordinary" to overcome the presumption. Finally, and critically to the present discussion, even a rule which grants the sentencing judge a range of choices upon conviction, subject only to the constraints that he explain his choice and that the choice be a reasonable one, allows for the operation of law within the range so long as an appellate court has the power to reverse a within-range sentence on the ground that the judge's choice to impose it was unreasonable.
This last type of sentencing rule deserves particular attention because it is, in its essence, the post-Booker federal system at issue in Claiborne and Rita. Booker found the federal sentencing guidelines unconstitutional because they prohibited a judge from imposing a sentence above the range created by the Guidelines' base offense level unless the judge found some additional aggravating fact that would either increase the sentencing range or permit an upward departure. The Booker remedial opinion sought to circumvent this difficulty by making the guidelines advisory. However, declaring the guidelines advisory does not alter the fundamental requirements of rational decisionmaking. After Booker, a sentencing judge is still presented with a statutorily created range of sentencing choices. For example, a defendant convicted of the crime of mail fraud is subject to a range of punishment from probation to twenty years imprisonment.
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A sentence at the upper end of such a range cannot be rationally justified unless the judge finds some fact in addition to the elements of the crime.
In the case of federal sentencing, the logical imperatives of rational decisionmaking are reinforced by specific statutory commands. Section 3553(a)(4)(A), 16 18 U.S.C. § 1341. suggestion that a sentencing consideration could be something other than a fact has equal force as applied to federal law.
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But Justice Alito is right and Justice Ginsburg wrong in Cunningham about a far more important point -the role of appellate reasonableness review. What transforms the provisions of the SRA requiring rational fact-based explanations of sentencing choices from a set of suggestions into a law subject to constitutional regulation is precisely the Booker Court's imposition of reasonableness review. Without appellate authority to reject some sentences as unreasonable correlations between facts and outcomes, the sentencing power of judges is unconstrained within the wide boundaries set by statutory minimum and maximum penalties and, insofar as it is unconstrained, is not subject to the rule of law. If the Supreme Court had not included appellate reasonableness review as part of its remedy, the result would have been a reversion to the pre-SRA regime of unfettered judicial discretion, the sole difference being a ceremonial obligation to consult guidelines that, once consulted, could be entirely ignored. Booker's imposition of reasonableness review means that it is a violation of the law, for which there is a cognizable remedy, for a judge to impose an unreasonable sentence.
It cannot be seriously maintained that a court of appeals applying the Sentencing Reform Act would find "reasonable" a sentence in which the judge imposed a term at or near the maximum sentence permitted by the fact of conviction without providing a justification based on a finding of one or more aggravating non-element facts particular to the defendant or the case. Therefore, as Justice Alito correctly points out in Claiborne, the Eighth Circuit held that the sentencing range produced by application of guidelines rules to certain post-conviction judicial findings of fact enjoyed a presumption 20 Under current law, one kind of non-element fact that could rationally justify a high-end sentence -facts regarding a defendant's criminal history --may constitutionally be found by a judge rather than a jury. United States v. Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. 224 (1998). That anomaly of Apprendi-land does not alter the fact that most defendants either have no prior criminal history or an insufficiently serious history to rationally justify a sentence at the high end of the range available to the judge upon conviction. For this majority of defendants, a sentence at the high end of the range remains rationally unsupportable, and therefore legally unreasonable, in the absence of a non-element fact unrelated to criminal history.
of reasonableness and that a sentence substantially at variance from that range could only be upheld if the trial judge identified extraordinary circumstances justifying the variance. 21 In United States v. Rita, the Fourth Circuit upheld a sentence imposed within the applicable guideline range in reliance on its general rule that "a sentence imposed 'within the properly calculated guideline range … is presumptively reasonable.'" 22 The issue presented in both cases is the weight to be accorded by sentencing judges to the Guidelines and their ranges.
The Government's Position
The problem for the government is that the construction of federal sentencing law it is defending in Claiborne and Rita -one in which judicially found facts create presumptively correct ranges higher than the minimum sentence legally authorized by the fact of conviction -is constitutionally indistinguishable from the guidelines regime 4) Before Booker, the judge was obliged to sentence within the range "unless the court finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that prescribed."
18 U.S.C. § 3553(b). The key word, however, was "unless." Even before Booker, a judge was not absolutely required to sentence a defendant within the range calculated after finding those facts specifically identified in the guidelines. To the contrary, the guidelines calculation did nothing more than create a range upon which Section 3553(b) 23 Because the defendant pled guilty, it appears that he also received a three-level acceptance of responsibility adjustment under U.S.S.G. § 3E1. In short, the court found that the range determined by application of the guidelines to judicially determined facts remains presumptively correct, but the presumption of its correctness can be easily overcome so long as the judge stays close to the range. Thus the "range of reasonableness" that is "within the court's discretion" extends somewhat beyond the bounds of the guidelines range. However, the presumption of correctness enjoyed by the guidelines range becomes harder to overcome the farther the judge strays from the range -until at some point the sentence requires "extraordinary justification."
In practical terms, this means that the diameter of the presumptively correct sentencing ranges within which a judge may sentence as an exercise of largely unfettered discretion, and outside of which appellate reversal becomes likely absent truly unusual facts, has broadened, extending some distance beyond the precise boundaries of the ranges specified by the Guidelines.
The size of the expanded ranges cannot be precisely ascertained, but Claiborne gives us a good outer benchmark applicable at least in the Eighth Circuit by holding that a sentence 60% lower than the guideline range requires extraordinary justification.
Assuming that it would apply the same margin to sentences imposed above the range, we The Eighth Circuit's reading of Booker is not unique in this regard. Any reading of Booker that assigns a presumption of correctness to the guidelines range will have the same effect. As the government correctly observes in its brief, the existence of a presumptively correct range derived from the interaction of findings of fact with the policy judgments of the Commission embodied in the Guidelines necessarily implies a principle of proportionality whereby the strength of the justification for a sentence outside the range must increase in proportion to the degree the sentence varies from the range. 34 The Claiborne opinion stands out only because the Eighth Circuit makes this point explicit and crystallizes its consequences by employing a number (60% variance)
instead of some vaguer verbal formula to delimit a point at which variance from the guideline range requires particularly strong justification.
The upshot is that a post-Booker federal sentencing system based on guidelines with presumptive force is constitutionally indistinguishable from the pre-Booker guidelines regime, at least if the standard of reference is the "bright line rule" endorsed in
Cunningham.
In both systems, post-conviction judicial findings of fact create a strongly presumptive sentencing range the top end of which is higher than the sentence that could be imposed based on the fact of conviction alone. The only change wrought by Booker is that the range is now wider and its boundaries less precise than formerly. Hence, Claiborne and Rita should win unless the difference between a constitutional and an unconstitutional system rests on strength of the presumption created by fact-finding, rather than on the employment of fact-finding to create one. The federal guidelines or similar state enactments should not even be a standard against which trial discretion is measured on appeal. All that should be required of sentencing judges is that they exercise reasoned judgment. First, the Court should reject the extremist view that no rule, guideline, or standard that correlates judicial findings of fact to preferred outcomes may constrain the discretion of a sentencing judge within the range created by jury findings or defendant admissions. To do otherwise is to say that law cannot operate within the range created by jury verdict or plea and that, within it, the constitution requires that the power of the individual sentencing judge be absolute.
Second, the Court should recognize that if the discretion of the sentencing judge within the jury or plea-generated range may constitutionally be subject to some legally enforceable constraints, then the Blakely-Cunningham "bright line rule" needs a codicil that defines the degree to which a standard or guideline based on judicial fact-finding may constrain the sentencing judge's discretion without offending the Sixth Amendment.
Third, such a rule might be very simple, amounting to nothing more than a description of the weight that may constitutionally be accorded on appeal to a rule or standard that correlates a judicially found fact to a preferred sentencing outcome. If the Court takes this path, it will have to speak in the language of presumptions because the law has no other language to speak of such things. Plainly, the Court will not permit a sentencing rule to create a mandatory, conclusive, or irrebuttable presumption, because Fourth, and finally, given many variations in sentencing systems to which the Court's constitutional rulings apply, the Court might elect to go beyond the language of presumptions to address other features of sentencing rules that act to constrain judicial discretion. These include, but are surely not limited to: (1) whether the fact of conviction generates only a small number of determinate, single-point sentences from which the judge must choose (as was the case under California law in Cunningham), or instead generates ranges within which the judge may exercise discretion (as was true in
Washington in Blakely and is the case under the federal guidelines); (2) in systems where conviction generates ranges, whether the ranges are wide or narrow, and whether there are few or many possible ranges; and (3) whether the universe of facts the court is to consider in determining whether to sentence in a range higher than that suggested by conviction alone is small or large. For example, the Court might distinguish the federal system post-Booker from the California system pre-Cunningham by observing that the federal system creates ranges, not single determinate sentences; the federal system allows for movement between many different ranges, while the California system had only three options; and the federal Sentencing Reform Act in combination with the Guidelines and policy statements identify far more facts, factors, and purposes as relevant to the judge's ultimate choice than did California. Based on distinctions of this kind, the Court might conclude that a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness is permissible in context of the overall federal system when it might not be in California.
Conclusion
The snippet from Lewis Carroll with which this article began pops up fairly regularly in legal literature, customarily to give a literary voice to the unexceptional observation that legal quarrels over the meaning of words are often arguments about the distribution of power. Still, even if neither the general point about law nor the choice of literary tag to illustrate it is startlingly original, both are, I think, unusually apt as applied to the Supreme Court's recent Sixth Amendment jurisprudence. In the line of cases beginning with Apprendi and running through Cunningham we have found out that "statutory maximum sentence" doesn't mean the maximum sentence set by statute, but something altogether different, and we have been introduced to a bright line rule that is anything but. Most importantly, we have watched the Court decide a series of cases nominally about the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial that have had virtually no practical effect on how many cases are decided by juries or even on the issues decided by juries in those cases that go to trial. Particularly in the federal system, the locus of the Rita and Claiborne cases, the effect of the new Sixth Amendment regime on jury practice has been nil. The jury trial rate in federal courts is now lower than it was before
Booker. 44 And in those cases that go to trial, juries decide no more facts related to sentencing than they did before Booker. The entire debate about the post-Booker federal sentencing world has had nothing to do with juries, and everything to do with the allocation of sentencing power between the judiciary (trial and appellate), Congress, and federal prosecutors.
If the Court is wise, it will address the issue of which is to be master of federal 
